From deep North to global governance exemplar : Fitzgerald's impact on the International Anti-corruption Movement by Sampford, Charles
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted/accepted for pub-
lication in the following source:
Sampford, Charles (2009) From deep North to global governance exem-
plar : Fitzgerald’s impact on the International Anti-corruption Movement.
In Australian Public Sector Anti-corruption Conference : Taking Respon-
sibility Fighting Corruption, 28-31 July 2009, Sofitel Hotel, Brisbane, Qld.
(Unpublished)
This file was downloaded from: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/43368/
c© Copyright 2009 Charles Sampford
Notice: Changes introduced as a result of publishing processes such as
copy-editing and formatting may not be reflected in this document. For a
definitive version of this work, please refer to the published source:
From Deep North to International Governance Exemplar: 






In pre-Fitzgerald Queensland, the existence of corruption was widely known but its 
extent and modes of operation were not fully evident. The Fitzgerald Report identified 
the need for reform of the structure, procedures and efficiency in public 
administration in Queensland. What was most striking in the Queensland reform 
process was that a new model for combating corruption had been developed. Rather 
than rely upon a single law and a single institution, existing institutions were 
strengthened and new institutions were instituted to create a set of mutually 
supporting and mutually checking institutions, agencies and laws that jointly sought to 
improve governmental standards and combat corruption. Some of the reforms were 
either unique to Queensland or very rare. One of the strengths of this approach was 
that it avoided creating a single overarching institution to fight corruption. There are 
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many powerful opponents of reform. Influential institutions and individuals resist any 
interference with their privileges. In order to cause a mass exodus from an entrenched 
corruption system, a seminal event or defining process is needed to alter expectations 
and incentives that are sufficient to encourage significant numbers of individuals to 
desert the corruption system and assist the integrity system in exposing and destroying 
it.  The Fitzgerald Inquiry was such an event. The article also briefly addresses 
methods for destroying national corruption system where they emerge and exist. 
 
Introduction 
To a liberal observer who was born in Queensland but who grew up in Victoria, pre-
Fitzgerald Queensland appeared to me and my colleagues as the ‘Deep North’ – a 
democratic enigma characterised by repressive policy and legislation which Colin 
Hughes succinctly and eloquently describes: 
… a journalist’s catchphrase Australia’s “Deep North” – authoritarian, 
racist in its dealings with Aborigines, heavy handed to the point of 
violence in its dealing with political dissidents, vulnerable to the pressures 
of multinational mining groups, and right wing groups opposed to liberal 
social trends, which have been at work in post war Australia, sensitive to 
states’ rights and deeply suspicious of national politicians and bureaucrats 
to the point of employing the antiquated machinery of the imperial 
connection with London against changes coming out of Canberra, ready 
even to contemplate secession from the Commonwealth of Australia.2 
Queensland was a state that had a one-house parliament since 1922 and lacked 
an independent parliamentary committee system to oversight the operations of 
government. By the time that Bjelke-Petersen was elected Premier in 1968, the four 
                                                 
2 Hughes (1980), p 10. 
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zone gerrymander, set up by the ALP when in office and bitterly criticised by the then 
Country Party, was retained and refined into the most potent electoral weapon in the 
nation.3   
Distinctive characteristics of the Bjelke-Petersen premiership were the close 
personal links between business and politics and a political culture that was 
autocratic, authoritarian, racist and oppressive.4 A laissez-faire attitude to 
development unencumbered by environmental or moral constraints, a police force that 
was viewed as an extension of government, a vicious administration that ruined the 
lives of tens of thousands of people such as Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders, 
civil libertarians and trade unionists as well as ordinary citizens, including small-l 
liberals, who had the audacity to oppose his administration, a blatant use of religion, 
and a patent disregard for the doctrines of ministerial responsibility or separation of 
powers was the modus operandi of government.5  
Supporters of Sir Joh point to the rapid development of Queensland during his 
record 19-plus years as premier: 
Throughout his premiership Bjelke-Petersen and his government sought to 
be perceived as forcefully promoting Queensland’s economic development 
and its status as the last bastion of free enterprise, at the same time 
staunchly protecting and defending the state’s moral and political values.6  
                                                 
3 Stanaway (1987), p 5. After analysing the results of the 1974 election and determining the uniform 
swing required to change government, a colleague and I were surprised to find what is now called a 
‘two party preferred vote’ of around 50 percent would have caused a change of government. We then 
realised that the gerrymander was primarily directed at the Liberal Party to ensure that the National 
Party would dominate the coalition even when they won significantly fewer votes 
4 Walter (2003). 
5 Fitzgerald (2005), p 14. 
6 Coaldrake (1989), p 3. 
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 The existence of corruption was widely known during this period but its extent 
and modes of operation were not fully evident; but when uncovered by the Fitzgerald 
Inquiry, his premiership was found to have ushered in a culture of corruption of which 
some critics believe only paralleled that of the NSW Rum Corp almost 200 years 
ago.7 At the time, it may have appeared as a surreal period in Australia’s political 
history – though examination of other systems indicates that we should not give Joh 
and his colleagues any back handed medals for originality.  
 
A New Model for Fighting Corruption — from the Hong Kong Model to the 
Queensland Model  
Twenty years ago, the Hong Kong model (a strong law and a powerful anti-corruption 
agency) was the preferred model for fighting corruption. In 1988, the election of a 
Coalition government under Nick Greiner brought a new broom sweeping through 
public administration in NSW.8 The result was the Independent Commission Against 
Corruption, Australia’s first dedicated corruption watchdog. This ‘watchdog body’ 
was created just months before the Report of a Commission of Inquiry Pursuant to 
orders in Council (the Fitzgerald Report)9 was handed down. The Report’s 121 
recommendation contained Fitzgerald’s vision for reform. Electoral and 
Administrative, criminal justice, and police were the three areas on which the 
recommendations were structured.  The major recommendations of the Report were 
the establishments of the Electoral and Administrative Review Commission (EARC) 
and the Criminal Justice Commission (CJC), restructuring of the Police Department 
                                                 
7 Sir Joh was loathed and loved (2005). 
8 Salusinszky (2009). 
9 Fitzgerald (1989). 
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along regional lines, ‘scrapping’ of the Police Department’s Internal Investigation 
Unit, abolishing the police Complaints Tribunal, and revising police rules compelling 
police to report misconduct to the CJC on a confidential basis.10 Fitzgerald 
recommended that EARC and the CJC report to Parliamentary Select Committees.  
 In his report, Tony Fitzgerald identified the need for reform of the structure, 
procedures and efficiency in public administration in Queensland. To provide a firm 
foundation for his reform, Fitzgerald recommendations included the creation of a new 
body whose role was to discharge those criminal justice functions not appropriately 
carried out by police and other agencies. This body was the Criminal Justice 
Commission (CJC). Fitzgerald recommended that the CJC be an independent body – 
independent from the police, the judiciary, the government, and the Opposition but 
reporting to a parliamentary committee. It was given the mission for ‘investigating 
and reducing the incidence of police misconduct and public sector corruption, 
monitoring and reviewing reform of the police service, and playing a central role in 
effective reform of the criminal justice system’.11 The CJC (now the Crime and 
Misconduct Commission) continues to be a spur to public service accountability. Its 
inquiries over the years have exposed accountability ‘sore spots’. Consequently, all 
governments have attempted to either influence or re-order the focus of the 
Commission. The Commission is the most public and probably the most testing 
ground for the endurance of the ‘Fitzgerald spirit’ and has been a major aid to better 
government.12  
                                                 
10 PC (1990), p 244. 
11 PCJC (1997), p ii. 
12 Preston et al (2002), p 128. 
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The Fitzgerald vision for EARC was for that body to undertake an 
independent and comprehensive review of administrative and electoral laws and 
procedures.13 EARC reviews began with the release of issues papers to stimulate 
debate followed by periods during which the public could make submissions, all of 
which were published. Once EARC released its reports, the parliamentary committees 
took further submissions before making recommendation to parliament. Notable 
EARC proposals included the Peaceful Assembly Act, broadening the scope of judicial 
review of administrative decisions, and reviews of the electoral system and local 
government electoral boundaries.14 It was the EARC process which took Queensland 
out of the era in which politics and public administration were largely unaccountable.  
What was most striking in the Queensland reform process was that a new 
model for combating corruption had been developed. Rather than rely upon a single 
law and a single institution, existing institutions were strengthened and new 
institutions were instituted to create a set of mutually supporting and mutually 
checking institutions, agencies and laws that jointly sought to improve governmental 
standards and combat corruption. Some of the reforms were versions of those tried 
elsewhere – involving the creation or strengthening of institutions15 or the passage of 
a package of administrative laws following the Commonwealth model. 
                                                 
13 Preston et al (2002), p 104. 
14 Preston et al (2002), p 127. 
15 The Auditor-General, parliamentary committees, the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel, the Public 
Sector Management Commission (which has evolved into the Public Service Commission), the Ethical 
Standards Command of the Queensland Police Service, the Office of Government Owned 




Some of the reforms were either unique to Queensland or very rare – 
Queensland Public Sector Ethics Act 1994 and associated regime of ethical standard 
setting; Queensland Legislative Standards Act 1992 which provided a means for the 
protection of human rights in the legislative process rather than just a judicial 
backstop; a powerful Scrutiny of Legislation Committee; an Integrity Commissioner 
to provide advice on conflict of interest and potentially other ethical issues affecting 
ministers and their advisors.16  
 
Identifying and Popularising the New Model 
I found this process fascinating and in my various papers and seminars sought to 
describe it. I called it an ‘ethics regime’. 17 One of the strengths of this approach was 
that it avoided creating a single overarching institution to fight corruption. There are 
dangers with a single, powerful institutional approach: 
 Such an institution might be so powerful as to be a threat in itself; 
 The corrupt only have to capture one institution to capture the fight against corruption; 
 A single institution cannot address the problem from as many directions; 
 Combating corruption is not enough – the goal is to make governments effective and a 
multidirectional approach is more effective.  
When ‘sleaze’ threatened to bring down the Major government in the UK, the 
government established a joint Select Committee on Standards in Public Life chaired 
by Lord Nolan. When I outlined the Queensland approach to Lord Nolan and his 
committee and committee staffers, they included a version of the model in their own 
                                                 
16 Preston et al (2002), p 156. 
17 See for example, Sampford (1994a); Sampford (1994b); Sampford (2000); Sampford (2001); 
Sampford (2002); Sampford (2005); Sampford and Connors (2006); Sampford et al (2005); Sampford 
and Wood (1993). 
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report.18 Of more lasting impact was his support for this approach at the OECD and 
its public management (PUMA) group.19 These organisations were involved in 
assisting new entrants to the EU to improve governance standards. The OECD and 
PUMA called the approach an ‘ethics infrastructure’, a term that was adopted in 
several jurisdictions and by the UN.20 The idea, however, was most effectively 
proselytised by Transparency International (TI).21 When their CEO, Jeremy Pope, 
visited Queensland, he proclaimed that this was the way to fight corruption and 
coined the term ‘national integrity system’22 typically involving a number of 
‘pillars’.23  TI and later the World Bank and other aid agencies adopted this term and 
approach. The integrity system was neither national nor particularly systematic but the 
choice of the term ‘integrity system’ rather than ‘anti-corruption’ system was inspired.  
                                                 
18 Nolan (1995). I was the first person consulted by the Nolan Committee in 1994 and he acknowledged 
the source of the Queensland example and the source of the advice in addresses to the OECD in a 
workshop on Public Sector Ethics in November 1997, the Ethics in the Public Service Network 
conference in Leiden in 1998 and in a lecture tour of Australia in 1999.  
19 OECD (1996); OECD (1997a); OECD (1997b); OECD (1998). 
20 UN (1990); UN (1997). 
21 Pope (2000). 
22 This story has been told many times by Jeremy Pope and others – most recently in an ABC  
 
Background Briefing report (www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/10/09/2710033.htm) 
 
23 Legislature, Executive, Judiciary, Auditor-General, Ombudsman, Watchdog agencies, public service, 
 media, civil society, private sector and international actors – traditionally shown as pillars of a Greek 
temple – though I later suggested a different visual metaphor of a ‘bird’s nest’ in discussions and 
papers for the World Bank and Transparency International. See Sampford et al (2005). 
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Corruption (the abuse of entrusted power for personal gain) is a derivative 
concept and a derivative goal.24 One cannot know what an abuse is without knowing 
what the legitimate uses of those powers are. Integrity (the use of entrusted power for 
publicly justified ends) is primary.25 While it is not true that all power corrupts, it has 
to be recognised that it will not only attract those who wish to exercise it for its 
publicly justified purpose but also those who wish to use it for their own purposes. 
‘Personal’ gain is very widely construed. It extends beyond personal enrichment and 
includes benefits to the power holder’s family, associates, political party26 – indeed 
anyone other than those who are the publicly intended beneficiaries of that power.  
If the only goal was to avoid government corruption, in theory, that, perhaps, 
could be achieved by not having government and, in practice, instituting anti-
corruption methods that encourage government inaction. The potential for corruption 
is built into all institutions because of the dynamics of collective action and agency.27 
Institutions collect power, people and resources for publicly justified purposes but that 
concentration of powers can be used for other purposes.28 We want effective 
                                                 
24 This is the most commonly used definition. There is an ongoing debate, however, about corruption 
definitions: specifically, what defines a corrupt act and in what circumstances. The definition of 
corruption is, therefore, complex and contested. For a fuller discussion of the arguments see, for 
example, Génaux (2004); Philp (1997); Philp (2002); von Alemann (2004); Sampford et al (2006). 
25 Integrity: defined as the use of entrusted power for publicly justified ends. See Dobel (1999); 
Sampford et al (2005).  
26 In polities where very large donations are required for political campaigning (e.g. US) or rewards for 
constituents (e.g. Japan), politicians may engage in corrupt behaviour while not benefiting personally. 
27 Heidenheimer (2004); Montinola and Jackman (2002). 
28 Sampford (1990). 
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institutions that deliver at least a significant proportion of the benefits they claim to 
deliver. 
The reason why we create and support governments, joint stock companies 
and international NGOs is because it is believed that more can be achieved 
collectively than individually with the pooling of people power and resources for 
shared goals.29 That decision, however, opens the possibility that institutional leaders 
may turn that entrusted power to their own benefit or use against their 
citizens/stockholders/bondholders.30  
A NIS evolves to increase the probability that entrusted powers will be used 
for its publicly justified and democratically endorsed ends and reduce the likelihood 
that those powers are abused. NIS will vary from state to state with similar functions 
being performed by different institutions. A NIS can vary in completeness and 
effectiveness, but there is almost always some base on which it can be built.31  
 
A New Insight – Corruption Systems 
While National Integrity Systems32 were seen to be the answer to corruption, 
Transparency International’s (TI’s) early comparative studies generated some 
surprising results. While countries with stronger national integrity systems were 
generally less corrupt than those with weak national integrity systems, the correlation 
                                                 
29 This approach is important when we examine the various domains of corruption that can exist even 
within a strong democracy and the potential effects. See, for example, Warren (2004). 
30 See, Keohane (2006). for his vision of a pluralistic, global accountability system and his analysis of 
the extent to which democratic principles can be applied to world politics and the implications for 
combating corruption.  
31 Sampford et al (2005); Pope (2008). 
32 TI (2000). 
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was not as great as it might be imagined. Some countries with very low levels of 
corruption seemed to lack institutions that TI’s model of a national integrity system 
seemed to need. Some highly corrupt countries appeared to have all the elements of 
the TI model – and some new ideas and improvements of their own that should have 
made their integrity systems even more effective.  
Unfortunately, the strength of a national integrity system is not the only 
relevant variable in determining the level of corruption.33 It is quite possible that the 
more significant variable is the strength of the ‘national corruptions system’ (NCS) – 
which is, in many states, better organised, better resourced, and more effective than 
the NIS. This may explain why some states with apparently limited ‘integrity 
systems’ are relatively free from corruption and some states with apparently extensive 
‘integrity systems’ remain highly corrupt. Coalitions of leaders are needed to create, 
reinforce and integrate the institutions of the NIS and to co-ordinate their activities.34 
While a NIS may be seen as the best way to promote integrity, the corrupt are often 
far more organised and in some states national corruption systems (NCS) may be 
better organised, better resourced and more effective – with long established patterns 
of behaviour, strong institutions, clear norms and effective positive and negative 
sanctions. The NCS will seek to disrupt and corrupt the NIS. As a corollary, the NIS 
should positively react. It should not merely seek to deter, detect and prosecute bribe 
givers and bribe takers but should first set to map and understand the corruption 
                                                 
33 See Doig and McIvor (2003). This article builds on a Transparency International (TI)-sponsored 
research study funded by the Dutch Government into the National Integrity System (NIS) in practice. It 
assesses the findings of the study to consider how the approach can work in practice, and what the 
approach can reveal about the causes and nature of corruption as well as the implications for reform. 
34 See Sampford and Connors (2006). This was a major conclusion of the first World Ethics Forum 
held in Oxford in 2006.  
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system then plan how to disrupt and destroy it.35  
Organised crime (whether gangsters or corrupt cliques) will always attempt to 
suborn or intimidate police, judges and any one official or institution within the NIS. 
A corollary, however, is not always noted. The task of the NIS is not just to prosecute 
corrupt individuals. It is to disrupt the corruption system so that it is difficult for it to 
function. Corruption flourishes in well-established networks where trust is present on 
both sides of the exchange relationship. This phenomenon is as old as human 
civilization; its forms subject to continual change and redefinition. Too often, moral 
accusations are aimed at the failings of individuals, thus distracting attention from 
institutional and structural patterns of corruption. Systemic, pervasive sub-systems of 
                                                 
35 Note that the approach based on ethical standard setting, legal regulation and institutional reforms 
that have been variously called an ‘ethics regime’, an ‘ethics infrastructure’ or a national integrity 
system concentrates on institutions and norms. I am cautious about explanations of varying levels of 
corruption based on ‘culture’ for a number of reasons. First, there seems little evidence that either the 
citizenry or public service of relatively corrupt countries with high levels of corruption are in any way 
pleased about the level of corruption. They may be resigned to corruption and even take part in it as a 
way to ‘feed their families.’ However, if given a hope of reform, they frequently demonstrate a dislike 
of corruption that is heightened by their regular experience of it. Secondly, much of the corruption 
involves the toxic interaction of different governmental systems each with their own logic and integrity 
(e.g. with the interaction of ‘big man’ local politics and Westminster systems of government practised 
remotely at the capital). As I heard one Papuan minister put it: ‘Swiss bank accounts are no part of 
traditional culture’. Third, using culture is as often an excuse by corrupt leaders for their behaviour, a 
justification by westerners for supposed superiority, or a counsel of despair for those wanting to give 
up attempts at reform. Finally, even if culture is a key factor, it can rarely just be changed directly. 
Eliciting ethical norms, passing formal laws, setting incentives, making corruption difficult and 
integrity easy are effective in combination in reducing corruption. They may also change culture 
indirectly – almost certainly the only way of so doing.  
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corruption can and have existed across a range of historical periods, geographic areas 
as well as religious, political and economic systems. A key operating feature of 
corruption sub-systems is that they are relatively stable networks that survive changes 
in personnel.36 Such networks support the common good of particular elites or social 
groupings rather than uphold the national public good. The failure of public trust leads 
to solidarity networks within a state. It is important is understand how corrupt and 
unethical subsystems operate in order to reform and change them. We can certainly 
recognise a well organised corruption system in 1980s Queensland and in many other 
jurisdictions.  
 
Revisiting Fitzgerald – an object lesson in the destruction of a Corruption 
System 
The difference between Queensland and many other jurisdictions that had suffered 
under corruption systems is that the corruption system in Queensland is no more.37 
That this is so is not the result of the Fitzgerald inspired EARC reforms. Long before 
                                                 
36 See Neilsen (2003). Neilsen, for example, identifies examples of exclusive corruption networks as 
criminal organisations such as the Mafia and the Japanese Yakuza and more subtle types of corruption 
networks, known as ‘crony capitalism’, as informal networks of large family businesses and where 
government officials control such activities as large loans from state bank that are not repaid, 
preferential government contracts, protected monopolies, investment banking and brokerage conflicts 
of interest, auditing, and consulting conflicts of interests etc. 
37 This is not to say that corruption was completely eradicated. Pockets of corruption persisted within 
the police service and within local government. However, the system of corruption with senior police 
and ministers playing a pivotal role and protecting the rest was at an end. When two ministers did 
appear to engage in abuse of power for personal gain, they were prosecuted and gaoled – with a new 
round of reforms to tighten the system. 
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the integrity reforms were put in place, the state’s corruption system had been 
effectively destroyed by the Fitzgerald Inquiry. That inquiry exposed the system of 
corrupt deals and payments – from pimps paying off individual police and developers 
paying bribes to intermediaries, to the chief of police, and the Premier: 
The Inquiry revealed that over the years links had developed in 
Queensland  between criminal and political networks. It also showed that 
… crime and corruption had become widespread across a range of 
activities including bribery, prostitution the operation of sex parlours and 
brothels, tax evasion, illegal gambling, SP betting, the rorting of 
ministerial expenses, protection rackets, money laundering, and, probably 
drug running.38  
The exposure was so complete that the corruption system operating within the state 
was effectively destroyed and could no longer function in its previous form. In the 
beginning, the Inquiry probed allegations of police misconduct and activities but 
eventually expanded to become a wide-ranging investigation into the entire 
institutional framework of the State.  
The methodology was instructive. Judicious grants of immunity were given to 
those who were prepared to disclose their activities.39 While immunities allowed 
certain witnesses to escape prosecution, without indemnities it is unlikely that 
                                                 
38 PC (1990), p 244. 
39 Ray Whitrod (a former Queensland Police Commissioner, whose attempts to eradicate police 
corruption were blocked by Mr Bjelke Petersen and whose resignation was forced by the latter’s 
appointment of the corrupt Terry Lewis as his Deputy Commissioner) in the Foreword to Phil Dickie’s 
book, The Road to Fitzgerald and Beyond wrote: ‘The revelations of the Fitzgerald Commission were 
unexpected because of the sterility of earlier official inquiries. The conscientious and competent 
approach of this commissioner must have dumbfounded many who thought themselves in no danger of 
exposure.’ Cited in Dickie (1989), p viii. 
 14
evidence would have become public.40 The Inquiry started near the bottom of the 
corruption chain, encouraging the ‘small fish’ to disclose in return for immunity and 
then worked up the hierarchy of ‘bagmen’ until the whole picture was exposed. At a 
certain point, it was announced that the Inquiry was interested in hearing from those 
who could tell them something they did not already know – and could offer immunity 
from prosecution.41  
Such strategies are not new. The key to success is to set incentives so that it 
will be in the perceived best interests of most members of the corruption system to 
disclose to preserve their interests. The risks to jobs, freedom and assets of keeping 
silent are greater than the risks of disclosure. If those incentives are set correctly, 
sufficient numbers will volunteer information and the rest will have an incentive to do 
so because of the likelihood of exposure. This outcome was the experience of the 
Fitzgerald Inquiry approach.  
 
Three ways to Destroy a National Corruption System 
There are many powerful opponents of reform. Influential institutions and individuals 
resist any interference with their privileges. In order to cause a mass exodus from an 
entrenched corruption system, a seminal event or defining process is needed to alter 
expectations and incentives that are sufficient to encourage significant numbers of 
                                                 
40 Ransley (2001), p 7; Dickie (1989). 
41 The admissions would not, of themselves, be admissible. The offer of immunity was effectively an 
invitation ‘for the rats to leave the sinking ship’ – leaving ropes for them to do so, but warning them 
not to hesitate in case someone else gave the same information before them. The tactic worked because 
the individuals offered immunity believed that the risks of non-cooperation were much greater than the 
risk of cooperation.  
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individuals to desert the corruption system and assist the integrity system in exposing 
and destroying it. Fitzgerald successfully pursued one. I would like to suggest that the 
same logic could be applied to make amnesties or truth and reconciliation 
commissions effective means to the same end.  
 
Sequential investigation with immunity 
The Fitzgerald model operated under a system of sequential investigation and offered 
general immunity as part of a public inquiry. The visibility of the hearings made them 
a powerful form of public disgrace for indemnity applicants that in important ways 
mimicked the exposure of a criminal trial. However, the real goal is to get sufficient 
‘little fish’ to come forward to expose the ‘big fish’ and help the public and 
prosecutors understand what the corruption system is and how it works and the latter 
can set about dismantling it.  
 
Amnesties 
An amnesty for corruption related offences would offer a much broader remedy in 
which all those who have been engaged in corruption but admit to their part in it are 
given immunity from prosecution, and depending on the extent of their corruption and 
their position, they may even keep their jobs or keep some of the ill gotten gains. 
However, the terms of the amnesty should not merely involve forgiveness for any 
corruption admitted. It should be based on the principle that full immunity is given if 
there is full disclosure. Failure to declare all, means that no immunity is provided. 
Selective reporting of corruption is not acceptable.  
An extra incentive to disclose could be in allowing those who disclose to keep 
a proportion of the proceeds of the corruption and to receive a proportion of the 
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proceeds of corruption of others which is proven. Three different kinds of case are 
envisaged for such amnesties: 
 ‘Small fish’ for whom corruption was what gave them a living wage – those engaging in full 
disclosure will not have to disgorge proceeds of corruption and keep their jobs; 
 ‘Medium size fish’ for whom corruption was genuinely profitable and gave them more income than 
they could have reasonably expected; 
 Some very ‘big fish’ might not be offered amnesty at all – we can find out about them from the 
disclosures of others. If exempted, it would offend our sensibilities to allow them to go free – for 
example, those who took the most, or held particular public office, or who had taken funds beyond 
a certain amount. 
One could even imagine a formula such as the following:42 
Amount of corrupt payments disclosed  %age disgorged 
 0–50,000      0 
 50–100,000       10 
 100,000–1,000,000     20 
 1–10m       30 
 10–50m      40 
 50–100m      50 
 100m–500m      75 
 500m        95 
 
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions 
                                                 
42 This formula operates similar to a tax on corrupt payments with a steeply progressive tax rate. We 
may have a higher rate of disgorging for officials who keep their jobs. One might also provide a 
percentage of the sums recovered from others who had not disclosed but of whose corrupt activity they 
had provided evidence. 
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The third mechanism would be a form of Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC).43 TRCs are one important element in the growing transnational institutional 
apparatus behind international human rights and humanitarian law. Truth 
Commissions are not courts of law but resemble them in important aspects: some 
have had subpoena and forced seizure powers; many have published reports 
apportioning individual responsibility; a few have awarded compensatory damages 
and submitted information to courts.44 Such a commission should operate with an 
institutional form of general amnesty45 and within a public process that ensures 
procedural fairness.46 
TRCs have a number of advantages over sequential investigation and 
amnesties. They are able to identify far more perpetrators than a reliance on 
investigations and prosecutions would have uncovered.47 Second, they allow for a 
public and systematic account of corruption in a jurisdiction than an amnesty and 
allow for further investigation beyond merely a receipt of the information under an 
amnesty. Finally, TRCs can be very useful and potentially transformative, where there 
is a practice or collective experience that most want to put behind them. It allows 
                                                 
43 ‘Truth commissions invariably, and appropriately, focus primarily on direct acts of physical violence. 
However, some have examined other forms of repression too, including expropriation of property 
without compensation, unjust dismissal and government harassment, and forced displacement.’ 
Freeman (2006), p 14.   
44 Freeman (2006). 
45 It is not necessary to offer amnesty to all. Those who have stolen more than a certain amount or those 
who have held particular kinds of office e.g. judges should, perhaps, be excluded. 
46 See Freeman (2006). He sets forth standards of procedural fairness aimed at protecting the rights and 
interests of those who come into contact with truth commissions.  
47 Blumenson (2006). 
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national recognition of a form of wrongdoing and a national decision to move on from 
it – with perpetrators admitting wrongdoing individually and collectively seeking 
forgiveness from victims individually and collectively. Whereas the forms of wrong 
doing covered by TRCs are generally concerned with physical violence, they could 
achieve the abovementioned ends for corruption.  
As with the version of amnesty suggested, full disclosure should be required to 
secure immunity. However, it is also useful if to operate on the principle, that the first 
to report obtain more favourable treatment.48 This would avoid creating an incentive 
to hang back and see what else comes out.  
The different mechanisms would require different levels of support. The 
sequential investigation model requires the support of key prosecutors or corruption 
fighters. It will also require a means for protecting those who have disclosed 
significant evidence of corruption (the whistleblowers). This is especially the case in 
countries where violence is used to silence opponents. In such cases, the protection 
systems for those who disclose should be, literally and figuratively, ‘bullet proof’.  
Amnesties and TRCs of the kinds suggested would require more widespread 
support than sequential investigations. They would require: 
 Strong leaders committed to reform are needed to bring about the cultural change that is required;   
 A real likelihood that prosecutions will be successful – preferably from recent and public 
experience; 
 Procedural fairness;  
                                                 
48 A system could exist where a sliding scale operates so that a witness before such a commission may 
get to keep some of the proceeds of corruption depending on whether they were a ‘small fish’ or a ‘big 
fish’ in the corruption system. For clean individuals who report what others have done, a reward 
system could apply. In the case of wrongdoers, future unlawful activity will produce full prosecution 
for previously admitted corruption and any future corruption. 
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 Sufficient investigatory resources to follow up the information generated; 
 Political will to drive and support the change which may be generated by the process (as in 
Queensland) rather than preceding it. In some cases, public demands may precede political will.  
 
Generalising the Methodology – the Prisoner’s Dilemma49 Writ Large 
All three methods (the sequential investigation by Fitzgerald and the form of amnesty 
and TRC suggested) are based on an exchange between the individually corrupt and 
the state (and its citizens). The individuals have information that the state wants – 
knowledge of individual corruption and of how the corruption system operates. The 
State has the capacity to grant immunity and, with it, liberty. The individuals also 
have something that they would like to retain and which the State would like returned 
– the proceeds of corruption. One of the central goals of all three methods of 
smashing corruption is to achieve an exchange of information for retained freedom. 
While the state would like a return of ill gotten gains, it is important to recognise that 
its greatest interest is in destroying the corruption system and it is better to receive a 
smaller or even token amount if this can be achieved.  
If the corruption system is strong, then neither the ‘big fish’ nor the ‘small 
fish’ see a need to admit that they were involved in corruption. The ‘big fish’ feel a 
sense of impunity because there are a number of defences they can deploy before they 
have to see the inside of a prison cell. They can: 
 bribe a prosecutor;  
 threaten any witnesses or co-collaborators who are tempted to give evidence against them; 
 kill the witness if the threat is unsuccessful;  
                                                 
49 See Prisoner's Dilemma (2007). ‘Much of the contemporary literature has focused on identifying 
conditions under which players would or should make the “cooperative” move corresponding to 
remaining silent’.  
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 bribe a judge;  
 secure political protection; 
 obtain a pardon. 
The ‘small fish’ have an incentive to stay silent because the proceeds of 
corruption, while small, are important to them because they receive so little. More 
importantly, there is the risk to them. The goal must be to achieve a radical change in 
the incentives and disincentives surrounding disclosure. It must be apparent that the 
risk of exposure is significant and the rewards for disclosure outweigh the risk of 
remaining silent. If possible, it should be simply too hazardous for rational officials or 
rational business executives to remain silent and compliant. 
For this to happen, it is essential that there really is a hazard – that 
prosecutions can be carried out successfully. The best way to demonstrate this is for 
recent prosecutions to have succeeded – meaning that it might be better to start with 
sequential investigation rather than an amnesty/TRC. The former can make the latter 
effective. However, the latter without the former might mean that the threat of 
prosecution and conviction are hollow.  
Provided the threat of prosecution is credible, one way to achieve the right 
balance of incentives is to build on the fact that corruption almost universally requires 
more than one person. The state should try to create a set of incentives and 
disincentives so that, in the corrupt individual’s mind, disclosure benefits them, no 
matter what their accomplices do, while silence benefits the others no matter what that 
player does.  The state should seek to create something analogous to the prisoner’s 
dilemma50 – without the dilemma.  
                                                 
50 ‘A slightly different interpretation takes the game to represent a choice between selfish behaviour 
and socially desirable altruism. The move corresponding to confession benefits the actor, no matter 
what the other does, while the move corresponding to silence benefits the other player no matter what 
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If the majority of those involved (generally ‘small fish’) will keep most of the 
assets and lifestyle they have and are not likely to be killed for such revelations, then 
it is in their economic interests to disclose. Failure to do so would cost liberty, assets 
and lifestyle. Silence achieves little if everyone else involved is silent too but is 
catastrophic if at least one other person discloses.  
The ‘bigger fish’ will have to disgorge some of their gains but still retain 
enough to maintain a more modest but desirable lifestyle. However, the more they 
have gained the more people with whom they are likely to have had corrupt dealings. 
Only one of them need disclose for the ‘bigger fish’ to lose everything. 
The approach to the ‘biggest fish’ may vary widely depending on the 
confidence of securing information from ‘smaller fry’. One may want to maximise the 
chance of securing the truth and achieving reconciliation. On the other hand, if 
enough evidence can be secured from the others, there may be no need for them to 
disclose for the public to know. They will then become symbols of the crushing of 
corruption (the system’s Sir Terry Lewis)51 and possibly a useful source of revenue.  
Such calculations should be made and will not be easy. The one thing I will 
say is that it is better to err on the side of generosity. The systemic benefits of 
identifying and stopping corruption make it clearly worthwhile. If the incentives are 
structured so that rational people would be expected to choose the path of disclosure 
                                                                                                                                            
that player does. Benefiting oneself is not always wrong of course, and benefiting others at the expense 
of oneself is not always morally required, but in the prisoner’s dilemma game both players prefer the 
outcome with the altruistic moves to that with the selfish moves. This observation has led David 
Gaunthier and other to take the Prisoner’s Dilemma to say something important about the nature of 
morality’.  Prisoner's Dilemma (2007). 
51 The Queensland Commissioner of Police, who succeeded Ray Whitrod, was the principal beneficiary 
of police corruption but lost his money, his reputation, his freedom and his knighthood.  
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then it operates at two levels, as a ‘double reason for action.’  The favourable balance 
of incentives and disincentives mean that an individual is likely to disclose. However, 
the fact that he or she knows that it is in the interests of others who were involved in 
their corruption and know of their involvement, gives a further reason for deciding to 
disclose. This is what generates such a powerful incentive to disclose and would make 
a corruption TRC so much more effective.  
 
Conclusion 
Tony Fitzgerald is rightly recognised for set of reforms that were introduced in 
Queensland following the EARC process he suggested. This was his main goal and 
his most lasting legacy. As he explained: 
The main object of the report and its recommendations is to bring about 
improved systems and structures. The past misdeeds of individuals are of 
less concern, except as a basis for learning for the future.52 
And in a later interview: 
…it would be mistaken to believe that all or even a significant part of the 
misconduct was exposed. My intension was rather to try to establish better 
systems for the future and a basis for changed attitudes in the 
community.53  
The EARC process systematically overhauled existing public institutions and, where 
there were gaps, created new ones. The presence of many interconnected integrity 
bodies and strategies facilitates integrity as a part of daily life in our major 
organisations, not least because diverse institutions are also able to hold each other 
                                                 
man (1989), p 3. 
52 Fitzgerald (1989), p 8. 
53 Fitzgerald cited in Cole
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accountable.54 Since then, many jurisdictions have developed ‘national integrity 
systems’ that rely not on one major anti-corruption institution to protect public 
integrity, but rather an array of institutions and procedure.55 In this way, Queensland 
moved from an ethical bad joke to a global exemplar.  The importance of this new 
approach and its replacement of the previously predominant Hong Kong model have 
been so widely recognised that his prior achievement and its general applicability may 
not be r
nd some states with apparently extensive ‘integrity 
system
erformed for Queensland and the lessons 
at can be learned from the way he did it. 
                                                
ecognised. 
The biggest variable in determining levels of corruption and the success of 
anti-corruption campaigns is the strength of the ‘national corruptions system’ (NCS) – 
which is, in many states, better organised, better resourced, and more effective than 
the NIS. This explains why some states with apparently limited ‘integrity systems’ are 
relatively free from corruption a
s’ remain highly corrupt. 
The success of Fitzgerald inspired EARC reforms should not obscure his 
earlier triumph – the exposure and destruction of the Queensland corruption system 
and the way he went about it. Indeed, further reflection demonstrates that the 
methodology behind his approach is applicable to three ways of tackling corruption 
head on – rolling up the system with judicious grants of immunity, amnesties and 
TRCs. The method or methods that are chosen should depend upon the internal 
politics of the state concerned. Whichever is chosen, they would do well to look to 




54 Costigan (2005), p 41. 
55 Costigan (2005), p 40. 
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